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ABSTRACT
The objectives of this study were (a) to determine the degree to which
I. G6mez
hard currency
earningsconstrainedoverall-imports and coarse grain imports in command economies; (b)
to measurethe importance of import prices on grain imports and to trace the link of grain
availability to meat production; and (c) to determinehow economic and political reforms
in the selected countries may have affected the hard currency constraint,the importance
of import prices, and grain imports and meat production. The resultsindicate thatimport
demand was constrained by earnings of hard currency, but was not responsive to world
prices, and meat production was affected by total grain availability, including imports.
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production, political reforms.
Under the planned economic system by which
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
operated, most consumer prices were fixed,
and production and marketing decisions were
predominately centralized. Regional economic
integration among these countries, formulated
under the Council of Mutual Economic Assis-
tance (CMEA), further insulated production
and marketing decision making, and shielded
intra-bloc trade from world market price sig-
nals. Intra-bloc trade consisted, in large part,
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of the Soviet Union’s willingness to offer
member countries, under favorable terms (i.e.,
at prices that did not reflect opportunity costs),
energy and raw materials in exchange for low-
er quality Eastern European goods that could
otherwise be sold at a discount on the world
market (Inotai). However, in spite of the ten-
dency to fix domestic prices, to centralize con-
trol of internal markets, and to satisfy import
demand through maximizing trade with
CMEA-member countries, some researchers
asserted that supplementary trade with the
West affected internal production and market-
ing decisions through the world price mecha-
nism and/or through the relative scarcity of
hard currency that was available to finance
these imports.
The overall objectives of this study are
threefold: (a) to determine the degree to which
hard currency earnings are a constraint on202 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
overall imports and coarse grain imports in
command economies; (b) to measure the im-
portance of import prices on coarse grain im-
ports and to trace the link of coarse grain
availability to meat production; and (c) to de-
termine how economic and political reforms
in the selected countries may have affected the
hard currency constraint, the importance of
import prices, and the coarse grain imports
and total production of meat. To address these
questions, the study estimates total hard cur-
rency imports, total meat production, and net
coarse grain imports as a function of hard cur-
rency inflows and other economic variables
for Bulgaria (1966–94), Czechoslovakia
(1966–92), Poland (1966–94), and Romania
(1966–94) using three-stage least squares.
The analysis builds on previous empirical
work by extending the period of study and by
providing a background into the transition to
market economy in these countries, summariz-
ing the important political, legislative, and
economic reforms in the early 1990s which
significantly altered the agricultural marketing
system. The results should provide insights
into the depressed state of the agricultural
economy in these countries, particularly the
meat sector, as a result of the economic reform
in combination with the constraints of world
prices and scarce hard currency resources.
Several empirical studies have examined
import behavior as a function of foreign ex-
change constraints in less developed countries
(LDCS) and in centrally planned economies
(CPES), taking into account constraints in
world prices, hard currency resources, and
government import intentions (Hemphill; Sco-
bie; Jones et al.; Zeimetz, Jones, and Moham-
madi; Cochrane). In addition, a recent body of
literature describes the experience of the ag-
ricultural sector during the transition to market
economy (Rembisz and Rosati; Wadekin; Sze-
lenyi and Szelenyi; Due and Schmidt). This
study employs a model with a specification
similar to the earlier work of Cochrane, and
draws upon the recent experiences in markets
in transition to discuss the theoretical frame-
work of the model, prior expectations, and the
limitations of the study.
Literature Review
Import demand analysis has evolved from
modeling the import behavior of relatively
market-oriented economies, i.e., economies in
which the price mechanism, for the most part,
determined import decisions. Import behavior
was specified as a function of the price of im-
ports relative to the price of the domestic im-
port substitutes, real income as a proxy for the
overall productive activity of an economy,
some dummy variables for unusual periods or
for seasonal variations, some relevant lagged
variables, credit, and foreign exchange re-
serves (Learner and Stern). Hemphill’s model
of import demand in LDCS included the ef-
fects of foreign exchange receipts as a means
to measure hard currency constraints. This ap-
proach studied import behavior as a more cal-
culated response of a government’s macro and
long-run economic development objectives.
Both Scobie and Jones et al. note that im-
port studies at that time failed to give explicit
recognition to competing uses of foreign ex-
change and did not provide an underlying be-
havioral model of the balance-of-payments
(BOP) adjustment process. Scobie applied
Hemphill’s approach to study the effects of
foreign exchange receipts on aggregate import
behavior affecting wheat import policy objec-
tives in Egypt.
Jones et al. reported that there was little
understanding of how grain exports to the So-
viet Bloc were affected by interactions be-
tween variations in world prices and the hard
currency position in CPES. They attempted to
address the interplay between macro BOP ad-
justment processes and micro-oriented price
and income relationships affecting imports. In
CPES, currency inconvertibility and a lack of
hard currency had implications for the import
capacity. Centrally planned production targets
also directly affected intended imports. Rising
incomes in Eastern Europe between the late
1960s and mid- 1980s had demand implica-
tions for meat, which in turn affected coarse
grain utilization and imports. Hence, shortfalls
in agricultural production relative to produc-
tion targets (for whatever reasons) resulted in
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(Jones). Thus, hard currency allocations may
have an explicit role in determining import re-
sponse to world price movements and domes-
tic crop shortfalls.
The hard currency effect of world price
movements needs to be taken into account to
demonstrate that imports in CPES are some-
thing other than perfectly price inelastic. Zei-
metz, Jones, and Mohammadi applied the
modeling framework to study the effects of
foreign exchange rationing on the quantity of
imported grain to the Soviet Union. They de-
veloped a system of four equations to examine
import behavior affecting grains and the link-
age to meat production for the 1960–83 peri-
od. Their results confirm that hard currency
constraints do act as an import constraint and
the import prices are ambiguous, i.e., feed
grain import prices are perfectly inelastic, but
wheat imports are relatively elastic with re-
spect to import prices. Cochrane used a very
similar specification and applied the model to
the case of Eastern European countries for the
1970–84 period. In her results, foreign ex-
change constraints are a large factor explain-
ing import capacity, but actual import prices
also directly determine the capacity to import
wheat and coarse grains. This finding was sur-
prising in that it contradicted much of the lit-
erature reporting that imports in CPES were
perfectly price inelastic.
The Transition to Market Economy
The political monopoly of the communist
party in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland,
and Romania began to break down in the late
1980s, and ultimately ended in 1990 with
(more or less) democratically contested elec-
tions in each country. Consequently, the cen-
trally planned economic system slowly decen-
tralized in the late 1980s as countries
experimented with participation (or broader
participation) by the private sector. As a result
of the political changes in 1990, however, in-
stitutionalized changes (through decree or leg-
islative action) were implemented between
1991 and 1993. In table 1, a list of various
political, legislative, and economic events is
provided for a comparison of the four coun-
tries studied.
As a proxy to gauge the progress of each
country’s transition to market economy be-
tween 1990 and 1994, we use two indices to
measure (or account fol ) governmental policy,
the regulatory environ ment, economic free-
dom, and the political stability and risks. For
the initial situation, the country credit ratings
index for 1990 is used as a benchmark of the
state of the overall political and economic en-
vironment. According to the investment index,
a lower value implies greater risks. Hence,
Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were considered
less risky relative to Poland and Romania in
1990 (Institutional Investor). The Heritage
Foundation’s “index for economic freedom”
for 1994 is used to monitor the economic, po-
litical, and social progress (Holmes). This in-
dex is based on measures of policies affecting
trade, taxation, and banking; regulations af-
fecting investment regulation, property rights,
and wage and price controls; and fiscal and
monetary policy. The implication of this index
is that there is a strong correlation between the
degree of economic freedom and the economic
performance of a country. By 1994, according
to the economic freedom index, only the
Czech and Slovak Republics had economies
characterized as “mostly free” (Holmes). Fur-
thermore, Poland’s economic freedom index,
relative to those of Bulgaria and Romania,
suggests that by 1994 Poland’s economy had
become more market oriented, more open, and
less risky.
Although some experimentation with pri-
vatization may have occurred in the 1980s,
laws outlining the legitimized process of pri-
vatization were passed m Czechoslovakia and
Poland in 1990, and two years later in Bul-
garia and Romania. In most cases, privatiza-
tion was introduced in l)hases with the sale or
outright grants of smaller enterprises and/or
housing. In the latter stages, medium- and
large-scale enterprises and large-scale farms
and agribusinesses were to be privatized. Typ-
ically it was during these stages that agricul-
tural privatization stalled or was unsuccessful
in the economies in tra]lsition, a situation that
best describes the cases of Romania and Bul-204 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Table 1. Summary of Political and Economic Indicators and Implementation of Selected Po-
litical, Legislative, and Economic Reforms or Indicators, 1990–94




































year started 1991 1991 1990
year inflation peaked 1991 1991 1990
IMF-stabilization loan 1991 1991 1990
Gross domestic product (GDP)
largest annual reduction 1990 1991 1990















deficit z 5% of GDP 1992 1990 1989 1992
deficit as % of GDPh 1170 ‘7Yo 7~o 7~o
Convertible currency’ 1992 1991 1990 1994
Trade liberalization] 1991 1991 1991 1991
Sources: Economist IntelligenceUnit, Country Report and Country Projile; Holmes; Institutional investor: IMF, inter-
national Finuncial Statistics and World Economic Outlook; Rembisz and Rosati.
‘ Year that post-communist, democratically contested elections were held,
~Country credit ratings for March 1990; lower values imply greater risk.
c Index of economic freedom for 1994; MF denotes mostly free, and MU denotes mostly unfree.
dProgress is judged to be slow/fast relauve to the plan specified in the law. In some cases, privatization stalled or
second phases have not been implemented or scheduled,
CPercent of arable land,
f NA = not available.
~price liberalization means market-determined terms of an exchange, i.e., prices not set by governmentthrough fixed
pricing schemes, ceilings, or monitored or “recommended” prices.
IIThe deficit as a percent of GDP is given for the year when the deficit exceeded 5Yo.
‘ Currency convertible internally; some restrictions still may have existed affecting trade.
JCorresponds with the dissolution of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
garia (The Ecortorni,st). By the time the enter-
prises were to be sold, they had accumulated
large debts, much depreciated capital, and de-
teriorating physical structures, and, in the case
of agribusinesses, the government could not
maintain the social infrastructure (e.g., back
wages, pensions, schooling, maintenance of
roads, etc.) of the enterprise.
For the agricultural sector, only Poland had
private farms to a significant extent in 1990
(Rembisz and Rosati). Agricultural land re-
form was introduced between 1990 and 1992,
but by 1995 there was still no practical land
market available in any of the countries sur-
veyed. Price liberalization, like privatization,
usually occurred in stages, and prices of es-
sential products, which included food, were
among the last to be fully liberalized. Prices
of inputs were fully liberalized before many
food products, resulting in a price squeeze for
agricultural producers and depressing the mar-
ket for agribusinesses. Price controls and sub-
sidies usually remained in place longer for
state-owned enterprises (SOES), further
complicating the privatization of large state
farms and agribusiness enterprises. In Bulgar-Garcia, Miljkovic, and G6mez: Coarse Grain Imports and Meat Production in Eastern Europe 205
Table 2. Comparison of Selected Macroeconomic Statistical Data, 1989–94
Description 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Real GDP (1989 = 100)
Bulgaria 100 90.9
Czechoslovakia 100 99.6




Consumer Prices (7. change from previous year)
Bulgaria NA 24
Czechoslovakia 1 11




Balance of Trade ($ roil)
Bulgaria NA NA
Czechoslovakia 143 – 1,422












































































Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report and Country Projile; World Bank; United Nations.
Note: NA = not available.
ia, and to a lesser extent Romania, price con-
trol and subsidies to agriculture still occur, re-
sulting in continued budget deficits and higher
rates of inflation in absolute terms during
1995–96, while rates for Poland and the Czech
and Slovak Republics continued to decline
(The Economist).
As a proxy for the country’s ability and
willingness to reform its economy, the year in
which the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
provided stabilization loans is reported. In the
case of Romania, IMF loans were made in
1991, but the inability to stabilize the macro
economy and implement privatization and
price liberalization in a timely fashion resulted
in withholding of some of the funds. In each
country (for the period presented), the highest
annual rates of inflation occurred as prices
were liberalized. As measured by annual
changes in gross domestic product (GDP), Po-
land was the first to experience economic
growth, occurring three years after it cut its
budget deficit as a percentage of GDI? Ro-
mania came out of recession in 1993, one year
before Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Re-
publics, but its economy experienced the fas-
test and largest reduction in physical output.
The system of international exchange
among these countries ended with the disso-
lution of the CMEA in 1991. Furthermore, the
economic restructuring implemented between
1990 and 1993 affected production and the
marketing channels linking these countries.
Agriculture, which was typically one of the
most heavily state-owned and controlled sec-
tors in the planned economies, was expected
to suffer disproportionately from the adverse
consequences of such a transformation.
In table 2, selected statistical data are re-
ported for the 1989–94 period to provide fur-
ther macroeconomic evidence of the effects of
the transformation. The data provide evidence
that Romania, the country which was the
slowest in adopting reforms, suffered the
greatest reduction in total physical output rel-
ative to 1989, and more consecutive years of
annual inflation rates in excess of 100%. Po-
land’s shock therapy produced the highest206 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Table 3. Comparison of Selected Agricultural Production Data, 1989–94
Description 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994









































































































Sources: FAO, Production Yearbook; United Nations.
Notes: NA = not available, mt = metric tons, ha = hectare.
‘Grains include corn, barley, rye, oats, and wheat.
~The importance of grain is based on the number of hectares harvested and production in each country: Bulgaria,
wheat; Czechoslovakia, wheat; Poland, wheat; Romania, corn. The yield da~aprovide a proxy for weather implications
in crop production.
rates of inflation, but through an austerity pro-
gram was able to reduce inflation to less than
100% in 1991, and to steadily reduce the rate
of growth thereafter. Only Czechoslovakia
(and later the Czech and Slovak Republics)
did not experience annual inflation rates in ex-
cess of 100%, and was able to reduce inflation
to around 109o annually.
In the agricultural sector, data on overall
agricultural output, production of meat and
grain, area harvested, and yield of most im-
portant grain are reported in table 3 for the
1989–94 period. The Bulgarian agricultural
sector was most adversely affected, in per-
centage terms, by economic changes and by
other factors such as weather. Production was
primarily affected by full price liberalization
for inputs and limited price liberalization for
outputs, and the reduction of agricultural sub-
sidies and/or “soft loans” to agricultural SOES
by the government. In most cases, this process
began in 1991–92, but a drought in 1992 also
affected crop production in the region.
With the exception of Romania, meat pro-
duction steadily declined in the region relative
to 1989. In Romania, the meat sector showed
signs of stability in the first half of the 1990s,
perhaps reflecting a more gradual process of
price liberalization and a reluctance to stick to
an economic austerity program. The grain-pro-
ducing sectors also signal an economic con-
traction since 1989. The lowest levels of pro-Garcia, Miljkovic, and Gdmez: Coarse Grain Imports and Meat Production in Eastern Europe 207
duction are accompanied by the lowest yield
per hectare (of the most important grain)
which occurred in 1992 in each case except
Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, grain production hit its
lowest level in 1993 after another drought af-
fected production, in spite of more land being
brought into production. Of the countries stud-
ied, only Romania managed stable grain pro-
duction relative to 1989. The relative stability
in Romanian grain and meat production may
be explained by the fact that at least one-third
of the work force remained engaged in the
sector and that higher levels of state assistance
were provided to the sector compared with the
other countries (The Economist). However, the
incremental adoption of reform in Romania
also corresponds with weaker overall econom-
ic performance.
Model Specification and Data
Economic theory explaining decision making
in production and marketing of a CPE focuses
on two basic conditions: the centrally admin-
istered prices and production targets specified
in annual and five-year plans (Cochrane). The
economic problem of operating a state farm,
from the perspective of the director of the
farm, is to increase production in line with the
specified production targets subject to the in-
put subsidies provided to the operation. Inputs
generally were supplied to state farms based
on annual budget plans which reflected the
historical productivity and previous year’s in-
put allocation (Garcia and Silvis). Directors
who were best able to increase production rel-
ative to the targets were most able to convince
regional administrators to provide them with
more inputs in the future. As a result, most
economists argue that production and market-
ing decisions in CPES should not be directly
affected by prices. Hard currency imports,
however, are argued to be constrained on the
availability of hard currency in each of the
CPES. Consequently, import demand that was
not satisfied by the CMEA required imports
originating from hard currency markets.
Therefore, the link among world prices, hard
currency constraints, the import of feed inputs,
and meat production is established.
Cochrane developed a model to test the in-
teraction of foreign exchange and variations in
domestic production and domestic demand
shifters in determining grain import demand.
The model consists of four equations estimat-
ed as a system for five countries using annual
data from 1970–84. The first equation is a for-
eign exchange equation to measure total hard
currency import capacity; the second is a meat
production equation linking the meat sector to
the coarse grain and wheat sectors; and the
third and fourth equations are coarse grain im-
ports and wheat imports, respectively.
The model in the current study is a system
of three equations estimated using annual data
from 1966–94 for Bulgaria, Poland, and Ro-
mania, and from 1966–92 for Czechoslovakia.
Yugoslavia is not included in this study be-
cause of the changes in its national and eco-
nomic composition. The behavioral equations
in the model are as follows:
(1) THCI, = ac) -1-u, Earningsl
-t cizAEarnings, + aJADebt,
+ adDummy + .s,,,
(2) Meat, = (30+ ~lMeat,.l + ~zGNP,
-t & TCGA, + ~dDummy i- ezt,
and
(3) CGM, = yO + y ,DCGA, + yzMeat,
i- y, THCI, + ydPrice,
where THCI is total hard currency import ex-
penditures in real terms; Earnings are real for-
eign exchange earnings; AEarnings is the
change in foreign exchange earnings (from the
previous year to the present year); ADebt is
the change in a country’s real net external bor-
rowing (the change in net hard currency ex-
ternal debt from the previous year to the pres-
ent year); Meat is production of all meats
(including eggs and milk, and converted into
metric tons of meat equivalent); GNP (in con-
stant prices) is a proxy for income; TCGA is
total coarse grain availability in the country208 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
(previous year’s production in metric tons of
corn, oats, barley, and rye less the present
year’s net imports); CGM is coarse grain im-
ports in metric tons; DCGA is the domestic
coarse grain availability (previous year’s pro-
duction minus the current year’s exports);
Price is the world price of corn (value of total
world imports divided by total quantity im-
ported) deflated by the world CPI; Dummy is
a proxy to measure the effects of political and
economic reforms (with a value of zero for all
years prior to political and economic reform,
a value of one the year reforms begin in 1991,
and an increase of one for each year thereaf-
ter); Dum*P is a proxy to capture the inter-
active effect of reforms and the increasing im-
portance of prices in the economies (nonzero
values for 1991 and beyond); and ~,,are error
terms, The endogenous variables in the system
are THCI, Meat, CGM, and TCGA, and the
lagged meat variable is considered to be pre-
determined.
Three modifications are made to Coch-
rane’s specification: (a) because the sample
period includes the economic transformation
of the 1990s, dummy variables are included in
each equation; (b) a lagged meat production
variable is included in equation (2); and (c) an
equation for net wheat imports (analogous to
the coarse grain import equation without the
dummy variables) is omitted from the system
because wheat is not considered a particularly
important feed ingredient for meat production.
Otherwise, the specification is identical and
the variables are defined and deflated as con-
structed by Cochrane,
In equation (1), the intention is to measure
the country’s capacity to import from hard
currency markets. In modeling import capac-
ity, there are two conflicting goals that moti-
vate the central authorities: (a) to maintain
some desired level of international reserves,
and (b) to provide a smooth flow of imports,
or to ensure imports can be procured as need-
ed (Hemphill; Cochrane). The change in a
country’s capital inflows (loans and aid re-
ceipts) from the previous year (i.e., the vari-
able ADebt) should reflect the country’s ca-
pacity to import and should serve as a proxy
for a country’s expected expenditure on im-
ports. The variables Earnings and AEarnings
are also expected to explain the capacity to
import and to provide insight into the forma-
tion of expectations related to import deci-
sions. The dummy variable is an attempt to
determine the effect of reforms on the econ-
omy’s overall capacity to import. The dummy
coincides with the liberalized trade regime af-
ter the CMEA regional bloc collapsed, i.e.,
1991 and thereafter (see table 1).
The meat production equation (2) is in-
tended to capture the linkages between general
macroeconomic factors affecting import deci-
sions, the factors affecting production (under
a system of production targets), and the deci-
sion to import an important input—coarse
grain. It is explicitly assumed that including a
variable for internal prices under a system of
controlled marketing (i.e., nonprice rationing)
would be inappropriate. Information on do-
mestic subsidies to the agricultural sector
would be useful to determine the sensitivity of
livestock (meat) production to government
transfers. Unfortunately, such data are not
available in public statistical publications. The
dummy variable is an attempt to determine the
effect of reforms on the agricultural sector’s
ability to maintain production of livestock and
livestock products in an environment where
subsidies declined and relative prices directly
affected decision making.
In comparison to previous studies, one par-
ticularly important modification is the inclu-
sion of a lagged meat production variable.
Lagged meat production is expected to par-
tially capture the effect of the longer produc-
tion cycle involved with livestock production. 1
If production targets were binding on produc-
ers, then lagged livestock numbers (and there-
fore the production of meat) should have a
1The amount of meat that can be produced this
year is related to past decisions on whether to delay
slaughteringthe animal and the amount of time it takes
for the animat to be ready for market. The production
of meat is lagged only one year to capture the produc-
tion cycles associated with the production of smaller
livestock (those other than cattle), and is expected to
provide insight into the degree to which livestock pro-
duction targets were binding, Lags of longer than one
year were considered in earlier estimations, but were
not statistically significant.Garcia, Miljkovic, and Gbmez: Coarse Grain Imports and Meat Production in Eastern Europe 209
strong, positive effect on present meat produc-
tion.
Last, national income and grain availability
are included to capture demand-side and sup-
ply-side factors determining production of
meat. Income is included with the expectation
that meat production and consumption in-
crease with increases in GNP. Even under cen-
tral planning, the level of national income
would have been a determinant of how high
to set the meat production targets. Because in-
put prices are not available, and did not reflect
actual costs, coarse grain availability is ex-
pected to reflect the actual scarcity of inputs
for livestock production.
The coarse grain import equation (3) rep-
resents two linkages: (a) the link between the
central authority’s overall hard currency im-
port intentions (or planned imports) and the
import behavior when domestic grain produc-
tion expectations (or targets) were not met,
and (b) the link between meat production and
the decision to supplement coarse grain with
imported grain from the West. Each of the
countries considered are net importers of
coarse grain, although there are a few years in
which each country did export grain. In the
more common situation, grain was imported
and the payments tended to be made in hard
currency (Cochrane). This implies that the
overall capacity to import goods from hard
currency markets affected the decision to im-
port grain. In addition, since imported grain is
purchased on the world market where inter-
national supply and demand considerations
matter, international prices may have affected
the decision to import grain.
Conversely, if the production targets for
livestock were binding (i.e., the directors of
state farms did try to meet the specified tar-
gets), then grain imports may have been rel-
atively insensitive to short-run changes in
prices because grain needed to be imported to
avoid larger than expected slaughter rates. In
general, production targets for grain were
more difficult to meet because of the uncer-
tainty with respect to weather. Hence, the
more demanding the livestock targets, the
more likely grain imports would be required
to supplement shortfalls in domestic grain
availability (relative to the grain production
targets). If livestock production targets were
not strictly binding, then in periods of domes-
tic grain shortages and/or higher world prices,
livestock numbers would have been reduced
rather than spending scarce hard currency re-
sources to maintain targeted numbers.
Coarse grain imports are expected to be af-
fected by the domestic availability of feed
grains, the production targets of meat, and the
ability to supplement grain production with
imports (which is captured by the country’s
overall ability to import). Import prices are in-
cluded to determine whether import decisions
were sensitive to international factors rather
than centralized decision making of planners.
The dummy variable is included to measure
the effect of the reforms on capacity to import
coarse grain. To support the hypothesis that
prices began to matter (i.e., that the price elas-
ticity was something other than perfectly ine-
lastic) once the structural changes were imple-
mented, the interaction dummy (Dwn*F’) was
introduced.
The data sets for each country were com-
piled using the same sources to ensure consis-
tency and comparability across countries. To-
tal hard currency import payments and export
earnings, and hard currency debt are taken
from the Central Intelligence Agency’s Hand-
book of International Economics Statistics
through 1992, and from the Economist Intel-
ligence Unit’s Country Projile 1994–95 for the
1992–94 period for each of the respective
countries. The GNP data are taken from the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Inter-
national Financial Statistics, 1995 Yearbook.
All crop and meat production data are ob-
tained from various issues of the Food and
Agriculture Organization’s (FAO’S) Produc-
tion Yearbook, and the trade data are taken
from various issues of the FAO Trade Year-
book, The world price of corn and the world
consumer price index are also drawn from the
FAO Trade Yearbook. Meat production, in-
cluding eggs and milk equivalents, is aggre-
gated using the method followed by Cochrane:
one kilogram (kg) of meat equals one kg of
eggs (where 18.188 eggs equals one kg), and
one kg of meat equals 6.7 liters of milk.210 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
Estimation Results
Three-stage least squares (3SLS) is used to es-
timate the system of equations for each coun-
try under consideration (Kmenta; Johnston).
Once the economic considerations are made to
justify the specification of the model, the next
theoretical issue to be addressed when using
time-series analysis is that all variables in the
model must be tested for stationarity or sto-
chastic trends. The augmented Dickey-Fuller
test is used to determine the order of integra-
tion of each variable. If all variables in the
model are not stationary, it is suggested that
they should be difference, and the differences
used instead of the original variables (Harvey;
Enders). If the variables are integrated of dif-
ferent orders, the largest order of integration
should be applied on all variables in the entire
system, including any lagged dependent vari-
ables. This will further decrease the number of
observations and may lead to fewer reliable
inferences. Every variable is difference twice
in the system to accommodate the highest or-
der of integration suggested by the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test.
Diagnostics to check for the presence of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the
model are performed equation by equation.
The appropriate test for heteroskedasticity in
time-series analysis is the autoregressive con-
ditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) procedure,
which is asymptotically distributed as Xz with
one degree of freedom (Engle). In testing for
autocorrelation, the Durbin-Watson (DW) test
statistic is used for equations that do not have
a lagged dependent variable, i.e., equations (1)
and (3). When a lagged dependent variable is
included in the equation, the DW statistic is
biased toward rejecting the presence of auto-
correlation; therefore, for equation (2) the ap-
propriate test is to compute the Durbin h-sta-
tistic (Johnston; Kmenta).
The diagnostics provided by the regression
output permitted tests for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity. The regression results do
not provide any evidence of autocorrelation in
any of the equations. With respect to hetero-
skedasticity, only in equation (3) for Romania
(coarse grain imports) is a presence of hetero-
skedasticity detected. A means to correct for
this problem would be to reestimatedusing full-
information maximum likelihood. Since het-
eroskedasticity adversely affects the efficiency
of the estimated coefficients but does not re-
sult in bias, and since heteroskedasticity was
detected in just one of the 12 regression equa-
tions, the decision was made to not correct for
heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, the nature of
the dependent variable in the coarse grain im-
port equation is fairly different from the more
ARCH-prone variables such as the futures
prices for financial instruments, inflation re-
lated to macroeconomic variables, etc. (My-
ers).
The estimation results of the model for
each country are reported in table 4, with R2,
X2, and degrees of freedom reported for the
system as a whole. The R* statistics imply that
the model is able to explain more than 95%
of the variation in the dependent variables for
each country. The X2statistics suggest that the
model specification is appropriate. However,
these statistics must be used with caution be-
cause some, such as R*, are not strictly valid
when 3SLS is used (Johnston). The estimation
of the model using 3SLS also requires the
econometrician to be fairly certain of the mod-
el specification, because parameter estimates
are asymptotically efficient if and only if the
model is correctly specified.
Equation (1), total hard currency imports,
provides the most consistent results across
countries (table 4). In each case, hard currency
earnings has a positive coefficient and is sta-
tistically significant at the 170 level. This im-
plies that the country imports more hard cur-
rency items as its hard currency exports
increase, i.e., an increase in two-way hard cur-
rency trade. The coefficient on the change in
external debt is also positive and statistically
significant at the 1‘-ZOlevel in two cases. This
is also an expected result because international
loans and aid are likely to result in greater
imports of intermediate and final products, es-
pecially from the countries providing the
funds.
Finally, the coefficient on the change in
hard currency earnings is significant at the 1Y.
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prior expectation for the sign of AEarnings be-
cause it will depend on the willingness and
intentions of the policy makers to spend hard
currency earnings on imports from the West.
Only in the case where a government has clear
import regulations that do not change over
time is the coefficient on AEarnings expected
to be positive. Hence, a negative sign might
imply that trade with the West was more a
reflection of short-run disequilibrium in trade
among socialist countries, thereby necessitat-
ing increased trade with the West to an extent
greater than expected (or planned). The insig-
nificance of the variable at even the 10% level
in the other cases may be an indication of
equality of foreign exchange earnings to the
planned levels of imports-a result consistent
with previous findings (Zeimetz, Jones, and
Mohammadi; Cochrane).
The Dummy variable is negative and sig-
nificant in the cases of Bulgaria and Poland.
The result for Poland would seem to confirm
that the shock therapy approach to economic
reform would have very severe short-run con-
sequences for the country’s overall capacity to
import. For Bulgaria, the case is not so clear
because the reform program that was imple-
mented occurred at a slower pace, and the
state was not timid about reversing its policies.
Unfortunately, no balance-of-trade data exist
for Bulgaria to help shed some light on this
issue.
In the estimation of the meat production
equation (2), the lagged dependent variable is
not statistically significant. This result might
suggest that short-run (annual) production de-
cisions did not deviate too much from the tar-
geted levels specified in the five-year plans.
The coefficient on GNP is positive and sta-
tistically significant in three cases. The posi-
tive signs on the coefficient are as expected,
implying that meat is a normal good. The pro-
duction targets are expected to have been in-
creased by planners over time, in part because
as the wealth of the nation increased, citizens
would have been willing and able to spend
more of their income on meat products. The
coefficients on total coarse grain availability
(TCGA) are positive and statistically signifi-
cant in three cases. The positive sign reflects
that grain is an important input for livestock
production and its availability affects produc-
tion decisions. This might also be an important
indicator that input availability was the key to
satisfying the production targets for livestock
and livestock products. The Dummy variable
is significant in the case of Bulgaria only. The
positive sign is curious because production of
meat in Bulgaria declined dramatically in the
1990s when reforms were introduced.
In equation (3), the net coarse grain im-
ports equation, DCGA is significant at the 1910
level for Poland and 10% level for Czechoslo-
vakia, confirming that imports occurred when
the supply of feed grains was tight. The pos-
itive coefficients on meat production imply
that the larger the size of the herd, the more
likely imports of feed grains were needed to
augment domestic supplies. The coefficients
on meat production are significant in the cases
of Czechoslovakia and Poland. The coefficient
on THCI is positive and significant at the 1YO
level in the case of Romania, and at the 109o
level for Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The
link between grain imports and the capacity to
import is measured through the overall import
value of hard currency items; hence, the result
implies that the overall constraint to import
affected important decisions regarding feed
grains only in the case of Romania.
An important departure from the results of
some previous work (Cochrane) is with the co-
efficient on the import price of corn. The co-
efficient on price is not significant at the 1‘-ZO
or 590 levels in any case. These results support
those economists who have argued that import
prices (i.e., world price of corn) did not matter.
In Cochrane’s study, the coefficient on price
(using the same definition and deflator) was
significant in all cases. The signs were as ex-
pected in all cases except for Bulgaria, which
was positive. The elasticities computed at the
mean implied that coarse grain import prices,
while mostly inelastic, were significantly dif-
ferent from perfectly inelastic. These results
could not be replicated when using larger sam-
ple sizes, i.e., including the decade before or
after the period of Cochrane’s study. The es-
timation results of smaller samples using the
data set for this study were very similar (inGarcia, A4iljkovic, and G6mez: Coarse Grain Imports and Meat Production in Eastern Europe 213
coefficient estimate and sign) to the full-period
model results reported in table 4.
The perfectly inelastic price response
seems to imply that either central planners
considered the livestock production targets to
be binding and the decision to import grain a
matter of meeting the targets, or that the price
effect on the import decision was factored into
the overall currency constraint. Hence, either
livestock numbers were reduced through
slaughter or grain imports continued to enter
despite the higher prices. In the cases of
Czechoslovakia and Poland, the significance
of the meat production coefficient may be ev-
idence to suggest that grain imports could be
managed through reduction in livestock num-
bers.
The dummy variables in the grain import
equation are used to test the hypothesis about
the implications of the period of reform on the
agricultural sector’s reliance on imports, and
whether the price mechanism became a more
direct factor affecting the import decision. The
coefficient on the dummy variable denoting
the period of reform is statistically significant
only in the case of Romania. For Romania, the
period of reform made the country increasing-
ly reliant on general imports (as noted by the
extent of the balance-of-trade deficit, table 2)
which also included import of grain. The in-
teractive dummy with price (Dunz*P) is sig-
nificant in the case of Bulgaria and Romania,
but the positive sign in the case of Bulgaria is
unexpected. According to the results for Ro-
mania, import prices begin to matter during
the period of reform and adversely affect the
country’s ability and willingness to import.
Implications and Concluding Comments
This study set out to examine the behavior of
import demand in Eastern European countries
with respect to hard currency constraints and
world prices during the 1966–94 period. The
study links hard currency allocation decisions
to the import of coarse grain and traces this
effect to the production of meat. The results
generally support the findings of previous re-
search that overall import demand was con-
strained by earnings of hard currencies. Coarse
grain imports, however, were unresponsive to
international prices, suggesting that producers
either tried to achieve the meat production tar-
gets even when domestic coarse grain supplies
were limited or that animals were slaughtered
in response to decreasing domestic grain avail-
ability. This finding contradicts the results
from a previous study by Cochrane which
used a similar method and the same countries
as cases. However, the results from her study
must be used with caution because the sample
period covered only 12–15 years of observa-
tion, ranging between 1971 and 1984. The re-
sults from the current work support the hy-
pothesis that world prices were mostly
irrelevant for countries with binding produc-
tion targets and controlled internal prices. As
anecdotal evidence to support the empirical re-
sults, consider the transition to market econ-
omy beginning in 1990. Since the reforms,
price liberalization only occurred in stages,
particularly for food products. Even when
state farms were allowed to make their own
production decisions regarding mix of live-
stock or grain production, farm managers still
admitted difficult y understanding the relative
prices of goods and inputs. Unfortunately, this
study does not go beyond the transition peri-
od—that is, when prices appear to be sending
the appropriate signals to producers in Poland
and the Czech and Slovak Republics. In Bul-
garia and Romania it is debatable whether, in
1994, internal prices for agricultural commod-
ities and food products fully reflected costs of
production and their opportunity costs.
Future studies should make an effort to de-
termine when internal prices in these emerging
market economies directly affect production,
marketing, and trade decisions. This will be
further evidence of the success of political and
economic reform. Another limitation of this
study was the inability to incorporate input
prices into the production of meat. This could
have provided some insight into whether (and
the degree to which) production decisions re-
flected changes in the price of inputs. Fur-
thermore, government transfers could not be
included. Government support to producers
would have made it easier for (and probably
would have required) directors of farms to214 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, July 1998
continue to produce the commodity mix that
existed prior to the reforms. Nevertheless,
hard currency constraints will force even the
most reluctant policy makers to accept that
market-oriented reforms are necessary and in-
evitable.
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